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Abstract 
This paper examines the unfolding impact of the Internet on politics and government in Korea 
and Britain.  While part of an ongoing research project, and not attempting a fully systematic 
comparison at this time, the paper explores available evidence about the scale and impact of 
online public participation, particularly in regard to major government websites in the two 
countries. It also considers government strategy for CIT, especially concerning electronic 
governance, and argues that both Britain and Korea have developed broadly similar and 
essentially top-down strategies, with detailed differences of implementation and some 
significant differences of emphasis. The Korean strategy encourages unmoderated online 
participation by the public, whereas the British approach seeks to foster participation in policy 
consultation in a more structured way. The paper then explores aspects of socio-political choice 
regarding CIT, utilising the theoretical perspective of the political opportunity structure to 
throw light on government’s informal dealing with citizen online participation and the adoption 
of Internet websites by members of the national legislature in the two countries. 
 
Introduction 
 
The new technology of the Internet not only allows more people to articulate interests quickly 
and conveniently and mobilise support for them at low cost, but also enables government to 
facilitate better public services. Thus, in this sense, we can say that electronic democracy – or at 
least electronic governance - is just around the corner.  The British government, for instance, has 
declared intent to create a new form of governance, befitting the information era. All ministries 
and governmental agencies have set up intranets and their own websites.  In Korea, too, we see 
a sharp increase in networking within and between government ministries, in the volume and 
quality of public information, and in public usage.  In this sense, then, Korea is also in fast 
transition toward electronic governance. The now rapid political adoption of the Internet, 
however, raises numerous questions. What implications does it have for existing representative 
democracy? Will the Internet modify current political processes, that is, what changes are now 
made likely by Internet use? Are there cross-national variations in terms of how the Internet is 
being used politically, just as other media have been used in different ways in different 
countries? To answer these and other questions requires macro and long-term perspectives. This 
paper attempts a more limited objective, by addressing the last two questions through 
comparing the political usages of the Internet in Korea and the UK.  
 
Basically, this paper starts by acknowledging both technological impact and socio-
political choice. However, it leaves aside consideration of changes in political community 
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caused by the technological factors inherent in the Internet. Instead, it puts emphasis on how 
different political contexts shape modes of political usage of the Internet. The two countries, 
Korea and the UK, arguably provide a good basis for comparison. First, the computer 
information infrastructure of both countries is at almost the same stage of development. For 
example, according to a report published by the Office of National Statistics in the Britain, 20.4 
million adults in Britain are currently using the Internet, comprising 45% of its whole 
population (http://www.ons.gov.uk), whereas 19.04 million Koreans, which is 43% of the 
population, have accessed the Internet (Korea Network Information Centre, December 2000, 
http://www.nic.ne.kr, http://www.nua.ie/ survey/). In other ways, however, the two countries 
contrast. While Korea is a late-developing country, both in terms of wealth creation and political 
democracy, the technological transformation of its society is now proceeding rapidly.  The UK, 
still often regarded as a model of parliamentary democracy polished over many decades, 
evinces a more cautious attitude toward fully embracing new technologies, both socially and 
industrially. The governments of both countries are pursuing broadly similar national IT 
strategies, including electronic governance, with detailed differences in implementation 
(discussed below). 
 
While much of our research programme remains to be done, this paper is an initial 
exploration of the complex relationship between political structure and the emergence and 
widespread adoption of a new technology. However, it deals with our central focus, on the 
interaction between government strategy for IT and the citizen’s online movement. In particular, 
our interest lies in how different political contexts in the two countries shape government 
responses as well as modes of citizen’s participation in online political activities. In our analysis, 
we adopt two theoretical frameworks to explain the changes in citizen’s political participation 
online and the changes in the political opportunity of their online political engagement. The 
former is closely associated with the three aspects of political participation identified by Parry 
(1972), while the latter is about specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements 
and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of social 
movements in some contexts while constraining them in others (Kitschelt, 1986).  
 
The hypothesis is that the Internet affects the mode, frequency, and quality of citizen’s 
participation, causing changes in political institutional structure, governmental procedures and 
responses, and the configuration of political power.  However, different institutional structures 
and differing governmental policies and procedures result in different levels of expectations. In 
Part I, a framework will be set out based on two relevant theories relating to political 
participation and the political opportunity structure. Part II is intended to present and interpret 
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data for Korea and Britain in terms of the theoretical framework developed in Part I. 
 
 
Part I: Virtual Political Participation and the Political Opportunity Structure 
 
Citizen and Government Meet together on the Net 
 
Discussion of politics and the Internet began from the perspective of its potentially 
revolutionary impact of “cyberpolitics” on the structures of representative democracy (Tofler 
1980; Negroponte 1995; Grossman 1995). Less visionary and more realistic accounts then 
emerged as to how the Internet is actually being applied within current political processes 
(Norris, 1999; Bimber, 1997). Widespread use of the Internet for political purposes is, 
nonetheless, held to correlate positively with civic engagement by way of a ‘virtuous circle’ 
(Norris 1999, 2000). While some authors thus argue that the Internet will encourage more 
people to be politically motivated in some way, other commentators remain sceptical (Margolis 
and Resnick 2000). Complex causal relationships are likely to be involved here, but the 
evidence gathered in the course of our research for this paper leans towards the ‘virtuous circle’ 
thesis, at least as applied to Korea. While only a small proportion of Korean users regularly surf 
the Internet for political information, many commercial portal sites not only provide political 
news but also conduct online polling, much of which is about political issues. Through such 
encounters, even the politically uninterested become exposed to political information and are 
presented with opportunities to become involved in political activities of some type. As some 
analysts suggest, those who obtain political information and participate in online political 
discussion become more knowledgeable about political issues, and are more likely to participate 
in politics, e.g. to vote, than those not going online (Davis 1999, Norris 2000). A survey (Kim 
and Yoon 2000) conducted in Korea shows that about 79% of those visiting political websites at 
least 5 times during the campaign season participated in voting in the Korean 2000 General 
Election. This figure is considerably higher than the national average voting rate, 57%, and 
higher still compared with a 50%. voting rate among those who have never gone online.  
 
It is now clearly apparent that the Net provides politicians and citizens with a more 
effective channel to contact each other than older media like TV or newspaper.  Once on the Net, 
individual voices that otherwise have not been heard can not only come to public notice 
relatively easily but also in some cases gain enough public support for policy-makers to take 
them into account. What aspects of the Internet are enabling these changes? How and where are 
these changing processes taking place? Is a new relationship between citizen and governments 
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becoming established on the Net, and how is this linked to the ‘real’, off-line world? To address 
these questions fully is beyond the scope of this paper, but we can initially identify a new 
conceptual aggregation of people, the‘virtual community’, characterised by Bimber (1998) as 
“more chaotic” than the off-line world, and with an “unpredictable flow of information”.  Foster 
(1997) has argued that “a new social process” is at work. While some authors distrust the notion 
of ‘virtual community’, this paper argues that they can and do develop on the Internet. Use of 
the Internet for political purposes can be adequately explained in terms of the uses and 
gratification model in political communication; people use the Internet for the gratification(s) 
sought and to pursue the expectations they have arising from their political purpose (McLeod 
and Becker, 1983). We would argue, furthermore, that people are drawn to use the Internet for 
political activities because, from a political economy perspective, they are induced by the high 
efficiency and low marginal cost of participation. In this, we follow Bonchek’s (1995) argument 
that the Internet reduces the costs of communication, coordination, and information.  Hence, the 
Internet should contribute to group formation, as well as to the efficacy and efficiency of 
activity to recruit and retain membership.  
 
Even if not determinative, communication structure is a key factor in shaping modes of 
political participation (Arterton 1987). More specifically, the range of media available for 
political communication affects not only the mode of political participation, but also its 
frequency and quality.  In these respects, we should not understate the advent of the Internet, 
despite the case made by Margolis and Resnick (2000) that the Internet has become ‘ politically 
normalised’. First, the Internet enables citizens in virtual communities to benefit from more 
interactive, more frequent, and arguably more effective ways of political participation. Second, 
political institutions are also affected by the adaptation of the Internet; for example, more 
decentralized organisation, more horizontal expansion, or more channels for direct democracy. 
Thirdly, governmental procedures to deal with citizen inputs, demand and support (Easton, 
1971; 1989), become modified by the new communication environment. Fourthly, the parties 
and interest groups go online, representing and mediating citizen interests as well as seeking to 
build their political capacity, electorally and otherwise. The effects of the Internet, in short, on 
both the input and output sides of the political system, may be cumulatively greater than those 
of other media technologies. 
 
Political Participation Online 
 
Political participation is the involvement of the individual, in various ways and levels in the 
political process, ranging from complete non-involvement to the holding of political office 
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(Rush, 1992). A hierarchy of political participation based on traditional communication 
structures may be modified on the net: a quantified model of political participation will be 
furthered through a survey in Korea and the UK.  As in the off-line political process, political 
participation on the net requires motivation and capacity as main factors determining the level 
of participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). Higher level involvement in the hierarchy 
of political participation requires stronger motivation and more capability. Online political 
activity requires expenditure on IT equipment (by an individual or organisation) and the 
acquisition of sufficient skill to be able to undertake the activities desired, whether simply to use 
email or construct an interactive website. There are also outlays of time, CIT running costs and 
the opportunity cost of foregoing other activities. Other things being equal, strongly motivated 
individuals will invest the initial time and effort to acquire the skills needed for online 
participation.  But individuals are likely to acquire most of the necessary skills through other, 
generally more prevalent, forms of Internet and IT usage.  So even relatively weakly motivated 
individuals may, in fact, possess the skills for online political participation. Once appropriate 
skills are acquired, those with stronger motives would be expected to select more time- and 
cost-effective options in the mode of participation, and to go online more frequently where this 
meets the purpose in mind.  From a political economy perspective, the Internet reduces the 
transaction costs of political involvement for a given level of motivation. Once Internet access 
becomes socially widespread, it facilitates larger scale political participation than traditional 
channels of communication. 
 
Considering political participation, the useful discussion by Parry (1972) categorises it 
under three main aspects: the mode of participation, its intensity, and its quality.  The “mode” of 
participation refers to the form it takes, and whether it is formal or informal. He argues that the 
mode will vary according to the opportunity, level of interest, the resources available to the 
individual, and prevailing attitudes towards participation in the society concerned, notably 
whether it is encouraged or discouraged. “Intensity” seeks to measure how many individuals 
participate in particular political activities and how often they do so, which also is likely to vary 
according to opportunities and resources. “Quality” is concerned with the degree of 
effectiveness achieved by participation, seeking to measure its impact on those wielding power 
and on policy-making. The quality of political participation is also influenced by opportunities 
and resources, and varies from case to case. 
 
First, what modes of political participation are available? Many typologies have been attempted 
(see, for example, Arterton, 1978; Davis, 1999), but in this paper we propose a relatively simple 
categorization in terms of motivation (an individual’s reason for undertaking political activity, 
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whether for use or gratification) and cost (the actual or expected outlays of money, time, and 
skill, to achieve the intended outcome). 
 
 Consumption of political information and public services is the most 
moderate online involvement in political activities. It does not necessarily 
require higher level of motivation, that is, such activities can be carried out 
through individuals attending to their daily needs, or even in “more accidental 
than purposive” ways (Norris, 1999a). However, consumption activities are 
important because, in performing them, individuals cross the threshold of 
political socialization, even those who normally consider themselves socially 
or psychologically remote from political issues. 
 Interest articulation involves types of activities requiring relatively high 
motivation and opportunity cost, like sending e-mail to politicians or 
government officials, or posting a political message on a bulletin board. 
Although requiring relatively high motivation these activities often relate to 
protecting personal interest, directly or indirectly, and thus motivation may 
well be strong. In contrast, the opportunity cost varies according to, for 
example, the degree of urgency involved or the specific political (rather than 
technological) difficulties facing the individual in the effort to protect 
personal interest or promote personal values. It seems plausible that in the US, 
for example, Internet-based communication is now on a par with the phone, 
fax or letter as a medium of direct interest articulation between citizens and 
government. 
 In contrast, Support includes such activities as contributing online to a 
politician’s fund raising. The distinction between support and interest 
articulation blurs somewhat, but the former category is often closer to 
voluntary activities supporting public interest or common causes, or 
contributing to a political fund, instead of protecting individual interest. 
Support imposes, in most cases, a higher monetary or opportunity cost than 
interest articulation, but the level of motivation varies according to individual 
orientation for the reason and social network. The religious right in the US 
demonstrated the viability of fund-raising through direct-mail in the 1970s 
and 1980s, and this feasibility now extends to political fund-raising online.  
Once people have acquired the habit of online purchasing of goods and 
services, using credit or charge cards to register support for causes or 
candidates they believe in becomes a convenient mode of pursuing personal 
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political beliefs and externalising individual values.  
 Mobilisation and organisation require the highest level of motivation and cost, 
for the obvious reason that the individual now deliberately seeks to 
orchestrate the expression of opinion and activity, and is thus contemplating a 
different scale of political involvement.  Figure 1 schematically represents 
motivation versus costs in different modes of online participation.  
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Chart 1:  Hypothetical Distribution of Online Political Participation
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Second, how does the Internet affect the frequency of political participation?  We can 
glimpse the current pattern, and perhaps the trend, of online usage from data available for two 
major websites in Britain and Korea, respectively the website for No 10 Downing Street and the 
‘Blue House’ website of the President of Korea. The Office of the Prime Minister in the UK 
reports that in its first nine months of operation in its current form, the website for No 10 
Downing Street averaged 356,684 page hits per day, with an average number of 5,739 users per 
day. The Office of the President in Korea reports that about 20,000 users visit its website each 
day, and the total number of messages in the Open Forum (BBS) during December 2000 was 
9,721, while the number of e-mails to the President was 6,106 during the same one-month 
period. Both websites report a steady increase in the number of hits as well as a longer average 
length of user sessions over the last year. The data indicate that more people are being drawn to 
these flagship governmental websites, with a considerable proportion of them being repeat or 
even frequent visitors
2
. These websites are discussed further below. 
Motivation 
Cost (money, time, skill, resources) 
Mobilisation 
Organisation 
Support 
Interest  Articulation 
Consumption 
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Third, the quality of political participation can be assessed by effectiveness, as Parry 
suggests, and, in addition, by equality. Political participation may be regarded as most effective 
when the policy outcomes are much as participants intend. Success can be further distinguished 
between procedural and substantive outcomes (Kitschelt, 1986). Procedural success implies  
recognition that a legitimate claim has been made, which should be admitted to the public 
agenda for due consideration.  Thus participants are given access to the decision-making 
procedure. Substantive success, by contrast, is concerned with results rather than procedures, 
with the focus on the actual outcome of the public decision-making procedure.  Substantive 
success is far harder to achieve, of course, because the demands of one claimant are frequently 
negated or counter-balanced by those of rival claimants.  Even the appearance of procedural 
success may be illusory.  An automatic response application is often set up in web servers, in an 
effort to satisfy participants’ desire that someone in government will actually attend to their 
appeals.  Thus, a pre-written (but totally non-committal) message is transmitted to the effect that 
“We received your message without any problem and your matters are under consideration.” 
The website host does not waste time responding to messages individually, but uses the time 
saved for working on substantive measures (perhaps)! 
 
Without denying the far-reaching potential of the Internet for easing, speeding, and 
broadening communication between citizens and government, two notes of realism must be  
sounded.  First, the issue of inequality of resources in traditional political processes is now 
compounded by that of inequality in technological opportunity, the so called ‘digital divide’. In 
all countries so far studied, individuals with readiest access to the Internet are disproportionately 
found, at present, among the better-off and better educated strata of the population. Those 
already well furnished with conventional political resources are also likely to be early adopters 
of the Internet for political uses, realising how it can dramatically ease the burden of acquiring 
and disseminating information.  In the absence of sustained and substantial public policy to 
widen access to the Internet, the outcome of the Internet “revolution” may well be to widen 
political inequality further (Margolis and Resnick, 2000). As these and other analysts have also 
pointed out, and contrary to the euphoric expectations of some early commentators on electronic 
democracy, “traditional interests and established authorities have the capacity to reassert their 
control in the virtual political sphere, …rather than [the Internet functioning] as interactive 
‘bottom up’ format for public comment and discussion” (Norris, 1999).   
 
Political Opportunity Structure Online 
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Among many possible frameworks for considering political utilisation of the Internet, we will 
argue that the theory of the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) provides an effective tool for 
the analysis of virtual politics, especially from the perspective of the policy-maker or political 
activist or electoral candidate. New social movements, from which POS theory has evolved, 
have several factors in common with the concept of the virtual community.  One feature that has 
emerged in recent years is the potential of the Internet for protest politics: a highly dynamic 
mobilisation of support or protest is possible on the net. 
 
Introducing the concept of POS provides an effective way to develop a more 
contextually grounded analysis of political activities and movements and a more systematic 
comparison of the cases between our two countries. Among the advantages of this analysis, it 
makes it possible to depict evolving virtual political communities within the setting of given 
formal institutions and informal procedures; the former can be described as ‘hard’ factors and 
the latter as ‘soft’ factors.  Broadly speaking, informal procedures and strategies employed 
within the existing institutional structure are rather flexible but unpredictable, in other words, 
they are relatively ‘soft’.  The institutional structure, by contrast, is procedurally less flexible in 
accommodating citizen demands (and perhaps substantively less receptive too).  With formal 
institutions, it is important for citizens to identify the correct access point. This paper attempts 
to apply POS theory to the following questions: to what extent is the Internet actually altering  
political processes in Britain and Korea; and are there variations as to how these societies and 
their governments are using the Internet for political purposes?  
 
As defined by Tarrow (1994), the POS is the ‘consistent - but not necessarily formal and 
permanent - dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to 
undertake collective action by affecting their expectations of success or failure’. Kriesi (1995) 
proposes three broad sets of the political system’s properties, at which the level of the POS can 
be measured; (1) formal institutional structure; (2) informal procedures and prevailing 
strategies; and (3) the configuration of power. 
 
The Formal Institutional Structure 
 
The level of the POS on the Internet is determined in a major way by the extent to which 
governmental power is concentrated or diffused.  Where authoritative powers are decentralized 
decision making processes may be shorter or more accessible, where the extent of 
decentralisation is substantial, channels enabling a degree of direct control over policy agenda 
setting and decision-making process within government may exist.  That is, the extent of formal 
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access to political institutions and political decision making processes will be a function of the 
degree of decentralization, and of the degree to which direct democratic procedures have been 
institutionalised.  
 
The greater the degree of decentralisation, that is, the greater the number of points of 
access to formal institutions, the wider may be considered the extent of formal citizen access. 
Decentralisation of access is regarded as one of prominent properties of the Internet by many 
analysts, who deem the Internet as a medium enabling better democracy (Abramson at al, 1988; 
Tyler, 1997). Email speeds and eases communication between citizen and decision-makers. 
More fundamentally, the extent to which information can be electronically stored, sorted, 
transferred and manipulated on networked PCs goes a long way to level the playing field 
between officialdom and citizen.  If knowledge, proverbially, was power, then information – the 
prerequisite of knowledge – has become infinitely more transferable with networked digitisation. 
In that respect, power based upon centralised possession and use of knowledge tends to seep 
away through networks – or rather, it becomes more evenly dispersed. While this can lead to 
hyper-pluralism and political entropy, it also forces adjustments in typical modes of political 
decision-making, away from authoritative imposition towards bargaining, cooptation, coalition-
formation and consensus-seeking.  
 
The degree of formal access to political institutions also embodies the extent to which 
direct democratic procedures are institutionalised.  This varies considerably, of course, from 
extensive, regular, and binding (Switzerland, and many US states) to distinctly limited (the 
occasional, technically “consultative” referendum in Britain, for instance)  An instance of the 
Internet modifying institutional process was the innovation of ‘Policy Discussion’ areas linked 
to the homepage of the British Prime Minister, No.10 Downing Street, intended to encourage 
website visitors to contribute their own opinions, purportedly for review by departmental 
ministries.  However, the government’s adoption of the Internet in no way automatically ensures 
the decentralization of decision-making functions.  Rather, these same technologies may enable 
government decision-making to become more centralized, through enhanced co-ordination and 
control through informatics.  An effective capacity to implement decisions under conditions of 
widely dispersed network-based power is quite another matter.  
 
It should be recognized, however, that despite the possibility of more centralization with 
respect to the output side, the Internet can and does contribute to improved public access to 
formal institutions. To take a simple example, most British MPs now have email addresses, for 
instance. Or the Westminster Parliamentary website now enables those with a personal or 
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professional interest in the institution to follow its affairs or to research specific issues with an 
ease and convenience unimaginable when the researcher relied perforce on drudging through 
Hansard and Parliamentary Papers. Another example would be the Thomas website of the 
Library of Congress, which emphatically demonstrates the transformative effect of a 
magnificent electronic resource being placed at the service of the public, as well as those who 
work in the US legislature and its support services  “The people’s business” has become far 
more accessible to the people in their wired-up homes and workplaces than ever before in the 
history of the American republic – though not necessarily more transparent.  
 
 
Informal Procedures and Prevailing Strategies 
 
In so far as there is (as yet, to our knowledge) no legislative framework in Britain or Korea 
regulating the delivery of public services through the Internet, informal strategies or procedures 
typically employed by decision-makers in response to citizen inputs are more important than 
formal arrangements. The points of access open to the public may be many or few, but it is the 
informal interactions between decision-makers behind the websites and also with those using 
the website that “generate trust and norms of reciprocity” (Malony, Smith and Stoker, 2000). 
Kriesi (1995) introduces the concept of the ‘dominant strategy” to characterise the informal 
premises of procedure as “the shared implicit or explicit understandings that emerge from the 
political process and guide the actions of the authorities”. He categorises such strategies into 
two broad groups; strategies of exclusion (repressive, confrontatory, polarizing) and strategies 
of integration (facilitative, cooperative, assimilative).  
 
However, a modified classification is needed to describe online politics more 
appropriately, rather than the terminology of exclusive or integrative strategies originally 
intended to characterise relationships between authority and civic movement activists. In 
practice, we would argue that government’s informal procedures and strategies fall into either 
“active” or “passive” reactions. A government with a passive orientation toward citizen’s 
participation in online participation tends to confine online engagement to relatively narrow 
channels, for example e-mail exchange. An active government, by contrast, shows greater 
willingness and openness, by establishing and promoting, for instance, a fully interactive online 
channel through which people can share opinions and interact with each other, as well articulate 
a varied range of opinions and demands to government.  
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Power Arrangement within and between Political Institutions  
 
The distribution of power within and between political institutions affects the POS, and we 
postulate that the Internet tends to reinforce, rather than alter, this relationship.  The political 
authorities, particularly the executive, have the advantage of superior resources to set up and 
maintain websites and e-services to fully professional standards (Margolis and Resnick, 2000). 
The citizen using a government website does so on the webmaster’s (i.e. the government’s) 
terms.  Sometimes, however, the advantage may not entirely lie with those in authority. The 
distribution of power may be narrowly balanced, or competition between political parties at 
national or local levels may affect the expectations of citizen participants.  In his discussion of 
the POS, Tarrow (1994) points out that electoral instability may induce political elites to 
compete for the support of voluntary associations.  Maloney et al (2000) argue that the 
configuration of power among senior officers and between different departments may create 
cleavages and divisions that can be exploited by voluntary associations. This creates niches and 
access points that can be identified and exploited by nimble groups and resourceful citizens, 
using the capabilities of the Internet.   
 
Using POS from the perspective of the political activist and candidate for office, we 
would hypothesise that in the forthcoming 2001 UK General Election, political candidates for 
the major parties fighting marginal seats will be readier than candidates in safer seats to utilise 
the Internet to garner support and mobilise voters.  In other words, political decision-makers and 
candidates for office will seek to exploit the potential of the Internet where there are politically 
or electorally compelling reasons to do so. 
 
Given the relatively low rate of total Internet usage for political purposes in Korea
3
 and 
the UK, politicians and civil servants may expect just marginal effects at present from the 
development of the Internet as a channel of political communication. As the Korean and UK 
cases show, however, almost all the political institutions, ranging from local government 
agencies to central government ministries and parliamentary, have established their own 
websites; providing functional and promotional information about the organisation, delivering 
online public services, and (to some extent) hearing public voices.  Websites demonstrate 
governmental commitment to technological change, and help the political authorities to present 
an image of ‘open government’. It may be that this transitional period is the best chance for 
citizens and civic groups to attain their goals through the Internet while an internal debate 
continues among political elites, between those committed to the comprehensive adoption of 
information technologies, including the Internet, and their opponents.  
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Power configuration between different institutions or organisations, for example, 
between the executive and the parliament, or between the ruling and the opposition parties, 
determines the POS. According to the theorists of the POS, competition or conflict between 
governmental branches or party organisations in the balance of power will produce more 
opportunities for civic groups and citizens (Maloney, 2000). However, it is not clear whether 
this argument can be applied to online politics. In most cases, political websites reflect the 
political resources available overall to the organization concerned, or the network of political 
elites behind the website.  
 
Part II: The Political Opportunity Structure of Online Politics in Korea and the UK 
 
The Growth of Online Participation 
 
The trend of online engagement in Chart 3 below confirms that the Internet is drawing  steadily 
growing numbers of citizens to the leading “Blue House” Presidential website of the Korean 
government. This is probably also true for other government and public websites. The sharp 
increase in usage around March and again in October 2000 coincided with the advent of critical 
politico-economic events -  the summit meeting between the leaders of South and North Korea, 
and the government drive to reform the banking sector in the wake of the Asian financial crisis 
of 1997-98.  This surge in usage demonstrates Korean citizens using the Internet for information 
as major issues emerge or intensify; it also suggests the potential of the Internet for rapid 
political mobilization.  
 
Chart 2:  Number of Users of the Korean Presidential Website, by month, November 
1999-December 2000. 
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An equivalent case for the UK can be found in the increasing access traffic of open.gov.uk. 
The service was launched in August 1994, and by December of that year was receiving 3,500 
page accesses a week. By August 1999, it saw up to 14 millions pages accessed per week. In 
particular, with crisis events in Britain as in Korea, the usage of the website rapidly increased. 
For example, the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, in September 1997 triggered 3.5 millions 
page accesses per day.  
 
Table 1 below about the users of the official website of the Office of the Korean President 
characterises the orientation of the citizens surfing the government website. During December 
2000, about 20,000 users visited the website per day; the typical visitor viewing at least 20 
pages (presidential website, monthly report at http:// www.cwd. go.kr/report.html). While 
Internet use for public information is overall relatively low in Korea, the presidential website is 
a demonstrably significant attraction.  The evidence at present available does not allow us to 
quantify different categories of user with any precision.  However, we can report on the hit-rates 
for individual menus within the presidential website. 
 
Table 1: Number of Hits on Selected Individual Menus, Korean Presidential Website,  
December 2000 
 
Menu Contents Hit Category 
Open Forum Free BBS 1,905,987 I; S; M; C 
Library Official documents and press release 1,845,537 C 
Summit Special edition for South-North Summit 1,002,979 C 
Summit Special edition for Nobel Peace Prize  567,373 C 
President The President’s biographical data 363,575 C 
Kid Section Educational material for kids 214,102 C 
Youth Forum Magazine for younger users  45,775 C 
 
Source: The Section of Public Affairs, the Office of the President 
Note: In Category column, ‘C’ stands for consumption of political 
information, ‘I’ for interest articulation, ‘S’ for supporting or 
disapproving activities for politician or other member’s argument, and 
‘M’ for political mobilization. 
 
The largest category of usage in Table 1 is the Open Forum bulletin board system (BBS). 
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This contains messages of many kinds; though at any time communication about specific 
controversies may predominate. For instance, over 40% of messages on the BBS in December 
2000 involved a dispute between chemists and physicians, with spokespersons and supporters 
on each side engaging in public online lobbying regarding the government’s intention to amend 
related legislature.  Another 40% of contributions focused around discussion and criticism of 
government policy to reform the financial market. Other messages amounted to mobilization 
efforts.
4
 There are also likely to be numerous consumers of political information, who did not 
themselves contribute to Open Forum, but who browsed the messages contained in it. Other 
menus in the presidential website provide background information about major policies and 
(self-)estimations of government performance.  
 
According to Kim and Yoon (1998), Korean Internet users are more interested in 
obtaining government documents and political information than in engaging in interactive 
discussion.  They claim their findings reflect the practice in Korea for government and political 
organization to bar public access to information crucial for control of political power. Whatever 
the truth of this accusation, a more plausible explanation would seem to be that Korean citizens 
were not familiar with, or trained for, interactive discourse on political issues. As we now see, 
people are becoming keener to interact online with other members of the public, as well as 
being more ready to contact government officials. The following chart shows that people have 
been switching to Open Forum, the BBS one-to-many and more interactive channel, away from 
the official email channel to the President.  
 
Chart 3: Changes in the Number of Messages on Open Forum, E-mail to the President and 
E-mail to the Webmaster During the Year 2000 
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Chart 3 shows the number of emails to the President declining, while BBS messages have 
increased.
5
 At least two interpretations are possible to account for this trend.  Firstly, that many 
users are turning their back on the President, and using Open Forum to ventilate their criticisms. 
Secondly, the shift may be one of user orientation towards the Presidential website, away from 
using one-to-one channels towards a more public, one-to-many channel.  
 
We can also gain some idea about the frequency, and intensity, of political participation 
on the Korean governmental websites. How many times in a given period has an individual 
participant sent messages to a government official or posted a message to a political BBS? The 
data indicate that some individuals communicate far more intensively than others.  Among 
9,721 messages posted on Open Forum in two weeks of December 2000 in the Presidential 
‘Blue House’ website, over 60% of the messages were sent by just 10% of contributors. A 
relatively small number of concerned, angry and/or compulsive users account for most of the 
messages received.  It is possible to classify these messages in some degree, based on the 
subject header and also on the use of user response. Most messages fall into one of four main 
kinds: reasoned criticism of governmental policy and/or record; policy-related suggestions; 
discussion of social issues; and unreasoned personal abuse of the President.  The BBS on the 
‘Blue House6’ website is unmoderated. By contrast, the website for No 10 Downing Street does 
not host a similar BBS feature, while the Policy Forum linked to the website (now located in the 
portal UKonline.gov.uk) are highly structured and intensively moderated, with the emphasis on 
informed and reasoned contributions. 
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The experience of the Korean ‘Blue House’ Presidential BBS suggests that the quality of 
political participation does not improve just because the Internet is available. Participants need 
skill, as well as motivation: an unmoderated and relatively unstructured BBS may work against 
the acquisition of the skills needed for interactive discussion.  Reasoned argument risks being 
crowded out by mindless and repetitious abuse.  Virtual net or BBS communities may be 
dominated by minorities of heavy users. These may or may not disseminate well-written 
messages and reasoned appeals for support. But they are likely to be politically, as well as 
behaviourally, distinctive. As Norris (1999) put it, “net political activists who sought political 
information or communication can be categorized as a distinct group within the online user 
community, as in society”.  
 
The quality of political participation depends upon the messages from citizens to 
government being clear and loud, as well as on a fundamental equality of standing as between 
one citizen and another. These criteria not only underpin the effectiveness of citizen 
participation but also contribute to the democratic ideal. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) 
comment that the voice of the citizen in politics should be “clear so that public officials know 
what citizens want and need, loud so that officials have an incentive to pay attention to what 
they hear, and equal so that the democratic ideal of equal responsiveness to the preferences and 
interests of all is not violated”.  How far the Internet currently contributes to this concept of 
effective democratic participation is hard to address from the limited data available to us. The 
first two items can, however, be discussed in relation to informal governmental procedure, while 
the issue of inequality requires a different approach because that problem is closely related to 
the social distribution of technology as well as existing power configuration.  
 
Interest groups and social movements have played crucial roles before in the relatively 
short and turbulent history of Korean democracy.
7
  Furthermore, the level of democratic reform 
which many Koreans expect tends to exceed that which political elites are prepared to meet.
8
 
The Internet offers effective tools for citizens to amplify their voices for political reform. For 
the first time, however, Korean civic groups took an important role in political reform in the 
2000 General Election as they led a successful campaign to persuade the public to throw out 
senior politicians whom they classified as unfit for public office because of corruption, laziness 
or incompetence.  A coalition of civic groups, called the Citizens’ Alliance for the 2000 General 
Election (CAGE), launched a high profile movement against a blacklist of politicians, deploying 
their campaign principally through the Internet. According to CAGE, when it opened its 
homepage (http://www.ngokorea.org) to the public on 12 January 2000, there were almost 4,000 
hits in the first 20 hours.  By the time of the election, nearly 1 million users had visited its 
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homepage, many of them participating in online campaign activities. Though other factors than 
the CAGE campaign could be involved, 59 of the 86 politicians on the CAGE blacklist were 
forced from office.
9
 
 
Rather than seeking to ban this largely net-based civic movement, the government 
crucially authorised disclosure of information on the homepage of the Central Election 
Management Committee (CAGE; http://www.nec.go.kr). This included the criminal records (if 
any) of candidates, their military service records, and official records of their personal assets. 
This information attracted over 4,000 visitors within the first two hours, who between them 
posted 280 messages on its bulletin board.  The government also approved the registration of the 
“Internet Korean Party”. Thus, government policy not merely tolerated but actively fuelled 
public engagement in an Internet-based social movement directed at political reform. In effect, 
the government went at least half-way towards meeting the expectations of its citizens on the 
Net. 
 
 
The Political Opportunity Structure on the Net 
As the Internet matured in the second half of the 1990s, it provided citizens in Korea and the UK, 
as in other democracies, with opportunities for new modes of participation in political affairs. The 
Internet has also begun to affect the formal institutions of both countries, their governmental 
organizations and legislative structures, particularly regarding access and transparency, as well 
the character of informal dealings with those citizen voices articulating through this new channel 
of political communication. Utilising the theoretical framework developed in Part One, this 
section of the paper shows how the formal institutional structure has been affected by official 
realisation that the Internet is a potentially more effective bridge between citizen and government 
than traditional modes of communication. We also examine the somewhat different ways the two 
countries’ governments are setting out to deal with emergent online participation. 
Two significant events occurred in Korea in 1995, in terms of these issues. First, the 
General Election for Local Assemblies and Local Governments was held on 27 June 1995, the 
first time since 1961 when Local Assemblies were dissolved by the military government.  Korea 
embarked upon a substantial decentralisation of power, further invigorating its young democracy. 
Political power, monopolized by small elites in central government throughout the previous four 
decades, began to be devolved to autonomous local government.  In terms of the argument 
developed in Part One, numerous new points of access for citizen participation and influence 
were created. In the same year, the Korean government launched a comprehensive plan for the 
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construction of the National Information Infrastructure.  Since then, and no coincidence, there has 
a rapid growth of governmental websites, often on an ad hoc and informal basis, as part of a 
public outreach programme.  With rapidly growing ownership of personal computers that can be 
connected to commercial online ISPs, Korean citizens can now encounter a wide variety of 
political information, whether provided by government, media organisations, civic groups, or by 
concerned individuals.  Users who feel so inclined have numerous opportunities to join online 
political discussion groups. In other words, network users have been exposed – and rather rapidly 
- to the era of extensive online political information
10
.  The Korean Government’s initiative to 
embrace the information era went back to 1986, when it launched the National Administrative 
Information System (NAIS) based on an old style host-terminal network. It was then that the 
government set out a plan to establish a national backbone network into which all the public and 
commercial sub-networks would be incorporated, and when the basic structure of the client-
server network was adopted for administrative affairs.  
In October 2000, the Korean government published a draft Bill for the Establishment of 
Electronic Government for public discussion. The Bill focuses on the goals of extensive 
electronic governance; maximization of administrative effectiveness, and citizen benefit. It makes 
some provision for standardisation in electronic official document, as well as for the security of 
the administrative network. More importantly, the Bill endorsed the concept of Internet-based 
public services and also the operation of online consultative committees. 
The UK government took an initiative to develop an information superhighway in March 
1994, when the Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency published a consultative 
report, “Information Superhighways, Opportunities for Public Sector Application in the UK”. In 
the same year, the government launched a pilot Internet information service, www.open.gov.uk, 
charged to investigate the technological and information issues associated with the electronic 
delivery of information and services to the public (http://open.gov.uk/services/about.htm). In 
1999, the British government collaborated with a consortium of other organisations to launch a 
series of projects promoting public access to the Internet. This resulted in the formation of 
UKonline (http://www.ukonline.gov.uk/). which is an Internet based portal for public 
information, that is, a single online point of entry to government information and services, 
scheduled to be accessible from over 700 UKonline centres by September 2002.  
The British government’s approach toward electronic government is clearly announced in 
the recommendation of UKonline (UKonline Annual Report, 2000): get all government service 
online; drive forward toward e-procurement and e-tendering; implement a cross-government 
knowledge management system; drive forward citizen participation in democracy as part of the 
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UKonline citizen portal; drive forward the use of authentication services both for e-government 
services and within government itself.  
Those initiatives driven by both governments for the development of electronic 
government, parallel to the formal institutional structure, have in common that they are 
essentially top-down approaches, while accommodating public involvement in political process, 
and establishing patterns of partnership between public and private sectors. In the Korean case, 
especially, this strategy is linked to the localisation of public authority, which expand the POS.  
According to our framework, the vigour and extent to which government proceeds with 
the  project of electronic governance affects the POS in three ways; firstly, transparency and 
information sharing – the e-government projects in both Korea and the UK aim to enrich citizen’s 
awareness and knowledge about the policy agenda; secondly, the new technology is intended to 
speed up the circulation of information, and the cycle of decision-making and implementation; 
thirdly, e-governance may or may not offer channels for citizen engagement in policy making 
process, but it may still be vulnerable to “cyber-protest” or even “cyber-terrorism” (for example, 
even citizens with limited IT skills can identify exact access points to which they could send a 
cyber ‘mail bomb’.  
The projects for electronic governance in Britain and Korea aim to create virtual 
government responsive to citizens and parallel to the real government. The frequency and 
intensity of citizen access to the formal institutions of government through the net decisively 
affects the level of the political opportunity structure. Each government’s e-government project 
reflects what is considered both feasible and effective within a given political structure and 
culture. As a framework for analysis, the characteristic features of, say, the legislature or the party 
system, may well provide a better guide to the POS than factors like the degree of direct access to 
the policy making process.  
The legislative enactment of electronic government will eventually formalise a movement 
which started with small scale experiments. Much will still depend on informal procedure, 
particularly in how government deals with citizen engagement, and also how quickly elected 
officeholders embrace internet technology as a key campaign resource. In fact, because of 
knowledge sharing among many governments
11
, formal comparison of electronic governance 
projects may not be very illuminating.  In contrast, informal dealing with citizen participation (in 
other word, the selection of political options)  may offer more insight. Though both Britain and 
Korea have similar strategies for electronic governance, there are significant differences. In 
particular, while the British government focuses on establishing “modern” electronic governance 
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as a whole instead of the Prime Minister’s advancement, in Korea, the website of the Korean 
President leads grass roots electronic democracy by promoting a large virtual community. 
 
The popularity of the Presidential website has already been described. But what use is it, 
and to whom? Behind the outwardly chaotic Open Forum of the BBS on the Presidential 
Website, a team works quietly, browsing all the messages received through the BBS and other 
channels for user participation, and sorting them in terms of the need for specific attention and 
governmental follow-up.  One of the main jobs the team conducts is to transfer each of the 
messages to the relevant sections of the Presidential Office, or to the ministry in charge of the 
policy area concerned. The other main job is to make a daily report to the President, based on 
the issues not necessarily ripe for media attention but showing signs of potential that could push 
the government into difficulties. These interactive channels function as a dynamic store of 
political issues, spanning the gamut of societal interests, ranging from key policy issues like the 
amendment of education acts to essentially private matters like a boundary dispute between 
neighbours.  
 
The presidential website is popular, and for several reasons. First, the website satisfies 
individual users’ desire to talk to the most powerful man in Korea. The president is inescapably 
a target for love and hate, depending on people’s political preference. The BBS particularly 
attracts those seeking political catharsis, more so than the websites of other governmental 
ministries dealing with more practical but mundane matters. Second, the official documents, and 
presidential directives and statements available on the website are regarded as useful by 
businessmen and journalists, especially given the weight of the president’s power within the 
Korean political system.  However, with regard to informal processes and the prevailing strategy 
of the POS model, a third factor is also important, namely to encourage large scale citizen 
involvement. Users of the Presidential website accumulate experience of procedural success, 
sometimes even substantive success, from their participation. This strengthens an awareness, 
which may become an expectation, that somebody in the Presidential Office listens to the voices 
on the bulletin board, and takes them into consideration. The Office restrains the extent of its 
involvement
12
 in Open Forum, whether as debate moderator or as final authority, but is 
responsive to what it considers to be valid requests for governmental action
13
. As a result, an 
extensive virtual community has formed, with many participants recognising other members’ 
nicknames and their orientation, as they debate the day’s main issues. Thus, virtual settlement, 
as Jones (1997) terms it, emerges around the website of the President.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider fully whether the formation of a virtual 
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community is prerequisite for online politics.
14
 However, some elements of virtual settlement 
can be identified, and provide criteria for comparison of the Korean and British cases. John 
proposes a minimum set of conditions to constitute the virtual settlement; a minimum level of 
interactivity, a variety of communicators, a common-public space (for interaction), and 
minimum level of sustained membership. Core elements among these conditions appear to be 
interactivity, variety, and membership.  
 
The British counterpart No 10 Downing Street website seems more passive in operating 
the interactive channel Your Say, more moderate in its outreach effort to attract people, and 
more structured in managing online debate. The site confines its purpose to “the communication 
of the UK overseas, the communication of news and information, the explanation of the role and 
history of Number 10, and demonstration of the government’s commitment to new technology” 
(webmaster’s answer to authors’ enquiry in the preparation of this paper, February 2001). The 
Policy Forum of the website, which was the only channel for interactive discussion, has been 
transferred to UKonline, resulting in a less interactive Prime Ministerial website. It is clear, 
however,  that central government has developed and is implementing a strategy of modernizing 
government, focusing especially on ‘effective delivery of public service’. The role of promoting 
and accommodating online citizen involvement has been taken up by UKonline, provided by a 
partnership among government, commercial sector organizations and trade unions. 
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Open Forum of the Website of the Korean President 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The website has two menu buttons; after reading a message, a user can click one 
button, good quality, to recommend the message to other users, or by clicking 
the other button, request to delete, can request webmaster to delete the message. 
In contrast, almost all the websites managed by Korean governmental ministries and 
agencies have open bulletin board system (BBS) on which anyone can post his/her messages, 
even anonymously, and share them with others. For example, the website of the Korean President 
has received 200~500 messages a day over the last year. This website stresses the function of the 
Open Forum as a cyberspace to display “all public opinion.”  While asking users to register their 
name and other personal information, the website confers the power to control the quality of the 
contents upon the users, collectively, free from intervention by the Presidential Office
15
. In 
contrast, no website of the British government has such an open BBS permitting citizens to 
  
Good Quality Request to Delete 
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interact freely with each other. UKonline operates a series of Policy Discussion Fora, taken over 
from the website of the Prime Minister, but a moderator sets the agenda for discussion, and 
intervenes whenever problematic messages are transmitted. This contrast arguably reflects the 
pervasive imprint of national political culture, both in the way that people behave online and  in 
the management strategy evidenced by each government.  Conscious of its image as upholding 
democratic values in the past when in opposition, the present Korean government displays utmost 
tolerance of public criticism, foregoing the power to control online content. Its political decision, 
“let the people speak, and we’ll hear”, appears to be working in building an online citizen 
community. A glance at the Open Forum gives some idea about the kinds of interests competing 
for attention, and where the shoe currently pinches at the citizen grassroots. In the Policy Forum 
in UKonline, by contrast, participants seem more knowledgeable and better trained in political 
discussion (or is it Whitehall house-trained?) than their Korean counterparts.  
Second, among political options for the usage of the Internet, the attitude of politicians, 
especially Members of National Assembly in Korea and Members of Parliament in Britain, 
reveals the effect of differing context in relation to party competition and the system of electoral 
representation. As of February 2000, while 66% of Korean MNAs now operate websites (see 
table 2 below), only 16% of British MPs have set up their own websites, though just over one 
third now have email addresses. (see table 3 below).  There are interesting regional and party 
variations in the pattern of website adoption. Our argument is that these variations are not 
haphazard, but the result of political calculation. The decision of elected office-holders to open a 
direct, online channel to voters reflects both their level of awareness of the new communication 
channel and the expected efficacy of the new medium in gathering votes. Our data for Korea and 
to some extent Britain indicates that elected representatives from constituencies with wealthier, 
better educated and more IT-aware voters are more likely to be early adopters of websites. 
Moreover, it shows that opposition party members in Korea are more likely to construct websites 
and use email, presumably in an effort to maximise marginal voter support. Davis (1999) argues 
that while politicians with substantial political resources tend to use information technologies 
actively, those politician with fewer resources rarely open websites. The evidence for the UK 
does not entirely support this thesis. The quickest and heaviest adopters of websites in the UK 
Parliament have been Liberal Democrat MPs, as table 4 clearly shows, and the Liberal Democrat 
party is certainly less well financed than its major party opponents.  
So why have the Liberal Democrats been quicker to adopt Internet technology?  There 
appear to be several reasons, cumulatively amounting to a rational appraisal of the political 
opportunity structure from a Liberal Democrat perspective. Firstly, there was wide-ranging 
discussion in the party after 1997 election resulting in a decision to push Internet use forward. A 
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predisposing factor was that party activists had already been using Usenet discussion groups and 
a CIX bulletin board for some years.
16
  Secondly, Liberal Democrat seats are often marginal; 
therefore every campaigning and presentational device counts in mobilising electoral support.  
Also, as the third party in British politics, the party label is less protective for Liberal Democrat 
MPs than for Labour and Conservative MPs. – the individual effort, reputation and popularity of 
Liberal Democrat politicians can be crucial to their electoral survival. Thirdly, the Liberal 
Democrats have traditionally stressed grassroots campaigning and constituency service, and a 
website can permanently advertise to that effect. Fourthly, following the electoral success of the 
party in 1997, there were considerably more Liberal Democrat seats to defend in Southern 
England, where personal computer ownership and usage is highest, giving a website greater 
potential reach and making it an appropriate channel to adopt. A final factor was that the setting 
up MPs websites not only developed a campaign resource but in the process created a cost 
effective national network for the party internal communication requirements. 
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Table 2: Korean Members of the National Assembly: Websites and Email Accounts 
 
Total      
(272) 
Region Party 
Seoul Metro 
86 (A) 
Local 
186 (B) 
Rul. 
132 (C) 
Oppo. 
139 (D) 
MNA with Web 66 % 
(181) 
83 % 
71/(A) 
59 % 
109/(B) 
67.4 % 
89/(C) 
65.5 % 
91/(D) 
MNA with Email 94 % 
(255) 
95 % 
82/(A) 
93 % 
172/(B) 
95.5 % 
126/(C)  
92.1 % 
128/(D) 
 
Table 3: British Members of Parliament: Websites and Email Accounts 
 
Total      
(659) 
Region Party 
London & 
Southern 
259(A) 
Rest of UK 
400(B) 
 
Lab 
417(C) 
 
Libdem. 
47(D) 
 
Con. & Other 
139(E) 
 
MP with Web 16.2% 
(107) 
21.2 % 
55/(A) 
13% 
52/(B) 
14.6 % 
61/(C) 
46.8 % 
22/(D) 
12.3 % 
24/(E) 
MP with Email 34% 
(224) 
39.8 % 
103/ (A) 
30.3 % 
121/(B) 
29.5% 
123/(C) 
95.7% 
45/ (D) 
28.7% 
56/ (E) 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
With the maturation of the Internet, citizens can readily interact with each other, simultaneously 
or asynchronously. Messages can be sent and shared, quickly and conveniently Users can quarry 
information of almost every conceivable kind from a multitude of specialised online sources, no 
matter where these might be located and however physically remote from the user.  This 
information can be transferred and exchanged on line with casual ease. Citizen activists can 
mobilize support online expeditiously.  And they can do all this with remarkably low transaction 
costs.  Once exposed to its advantages over traditional media and channels, it would be 
surprising if users did not adopt the Internet as the medium of choice for political 
communication.  Whether governmental and political elites choose to adopt the Internet, and 
how they seek to adapt to their purposes, is a far different matter. We have argued that the 
government of both Britain and Korea have developed similar strategies for the development of 
electronic governance, parallel to rather than in any sense replacing the formal institutional 
structure. They have in common that both are essentially top-down approaches, while 
accommodating public involvement in political process, and establishing patterns of partnership 
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between public and private sectors. While official strategy is broadly similar, there is a stronger 
emphasis on encouraging grass-roots participation in Korea, contrasting with a more structured 
approach to online policy participation in UK. 
 
We have interpreted CIT adoption by politicians through the perspective of the political 
opportunity structure, and thus start by recognising that the selection of options operates in 
different political contexts. Political regionalism in Korea is quite marked, while party 
allegiances are weak, with numbers of politicians switching between parties. Korean Assembly 
Members need to appeal personally to voters, and so as the Internet has matured there has been 
a rapid adoption of websites over the last 3 years (though content is sometimes little more than 
token).  A presence on the web is a form of permanent personal advertising. The development of 
MPs websites has been slower in UK, except by Liberal Democrats. Our argument is that for 
members of the two major parties, their electoral fate is largely determined by that of party. In 
safe seats, personal appeal is less critical , so from the perspective of the POS, the case for 
major party MPs developing websites is less compelling. 
 
Online political participation is increasing in both Britain and Korea though from a very 
modest level compared with non-political usage. Our impression is that, especially in Britain, 
the internet has yet to make any real inroads at the mass political level. It is, as yet, largely the 
preserve of those with a professional interest in politics, special interest activists and a small 
minority of politics ‘junkies’. Indirectly, especially as a medium of dissemination from 
government and parties, particularly to journalists, and for interaction with organised interests, 
its significance is already arguably considerable. In Korea, where attachment to traditional 
political structures and modes of behaviour is less deep-rooted (because the institutions 
themselves are newer), the impact of online participation has been quicker and stronger. We 
would expect the scale of public participation to grow, as the costs of online participation are 
generally decreasing. Firstly, the growing competition in the market for high speed access to the 
internet is lowering the real price to consumers. Several companies in both countries are 
competing to connect the customer to the web with different technologies such as ADSL, ISDN, 
or Cable Modem. The costs of information, as well those for access and participation, will 
continue to fall. Secondly, newcomers to political issues can quickly accumulate relevant know-
how and expertise, as the learning curve for effective political involvement shortens. Third, the 
costs of mobilization for political action are reducing as virtual communities emerge. Reducing 
monetary costs, opportunity costs and transaction costs should all make citizens more willing, 
even the very moderately motivated among them, to engage in online political activity.  
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In short, as the cost of online participation goes down, the virtual community, as the 
aggregation of people going online, pervades through the whole society, and political 
opportunity for better governance increase as well as boosting political participation. The 
question remaining is whether society should aim towards information welfare or accept the 
political and social consequences of a widening digital divide. 
 
 
 
 
. 
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Note 
                                               
1 This diagram will be developed with quantifiable data as research proceeds. 
2
 Over 56% of the messages posted on Open Forum in the Website of the Korean President are written by 
writers appearing at least 3 times during December 2000. Although the numbers of visitors to the website 
is growing, a relatively small number of users accounts for many of the postings.  
3
 According to a recent survey carried out in Korea, only 1.6% of Internet usage was for political 
information and public services compared to 53.7% for entertainment and games, 22.2% for leisure and 
sports, and 19.2% for general news service. Among those surfing the Internet for political information, 
males outnumber females by more than two to one, and there are over four times as many political surfers 
within the forty-plus age group than among those in their twenties (The National Survey of Attitude for 
Internet Use in Korea, February 2001, Korea Network Information Centre).  
4
 Open Forum, for instance, contains messages with similar content, for example, pressing for improved 
compensation for under-insured workers who have suffered accidents at work.  
5
 The sharp peak in the trend line of ‘email to the webmaster’ represents a ‘mail bomb’ form of cyber 
demonstration, as protestors attempted to crash the webserver. 
6
 Blue House is a nick name for the Office of the Korean President and the name of the website of the 
President, comparable to No 10 Downing Street for the Office of the British Prime Minister, and the White 
House for the American President. 
7
  See Pong Sul Ahn, “Industrialization and Democratisation: Korean trade unions in a double transition” 
PhD, University of Newcastle upon Tyne 1997. 
8
 In a survey, the New Korea Barometer, to the question, how much do you agree or disagree with the 
statement that our political system should be made a lot more democratic than what it is now?, seven out 
of eight endorsed reform. See Rose, R., Sin, D., and Munro,N.,(1999) “Tensions Between the Democratic 
Ideal and Reality: South Korea”, in Pippa Norris, ed. Critical Citizens; Global Support for Democratic 
Governance, Oxford: Oxford. 
9
 The blacklist includes 34 politicians from ruling coalition, 28 from the major opposition party.  
10
 Some projects were carried out by government during the early stage; the Office of the President set up 
its website to provide official document and press release in 1995; the Ministry of Information started 
web based information service (Allim-Madang) with the support of the National Computerisation Agency 
(NCA) in 1995; the Ministry also launched information service project through PC online service (Yollin-
Jungbu) in 1996; and other local government opened their websites. 
11
 Korean and the UK have been the participants of the Government Online (GOL) Project to exchange 
and share ideas and knowledge on electronic government, resulting in two e-government projects with no 
difference. 
12
 The reason for the reservation of direct response to individual message varies according to given 
situation. In general, as Stromer-Gallery points out, burdensome, loss of control, and loss of ambiguity 
can be considered as part of factors to explain why politicians avoid interactive discussion. See Stromer-
Galley (2000) Online Interaction and Why Candidates Avoid It, Journal of Communication, Autumn 2000, 
pp. 111-132 
13
 In some case, the Office presents favourable response, even in selective manner, and it provides the 
media with soft-touch news. For example, a user send e-mail to the President asking whether the 
President could present him a puppy, which appeared in the newspaper with the President. The user ’s 
reason is that his family has fallen into grief since they lost their loving dog, the same breed with the first 
dog. The Office decided to present it to the user.   
14
 In analyzing data, in relation to interactivity, it represents different result between when email, one-to-
one, to the President or the Prime Minister can be included as user-generating contents that contribute 
building a virtual community and when not. 
15
 The website has two menu button; after reading a message, user can click either of button to 
recommend the message to other users, or can request webmaster to delete the message by clicking other 
button.  
16
 Personal information to authors. Our thanks to Phil Appleby. 
 
